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The 2015-2016 presidential election campaign has had major effects on recent debates regarding 
U.S. Asia policy. Going into the campaign, the debates focused heavily on the efficacy of the 
Obama Administration’s signature “Asia Rebalance” and as a corollary the perceived U.S. 
weaknesses in the face of growing challenges from China. As the campaign has progressed, the 
broad concern with the rebalance and China remains active but secondary. Two sets of issues 
now overshadow the earlier focus: international trade and the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) accord, and candidate Donald Trump’s controversial proposals on allied burden-sharing, 
nuclear weapons proliferation and North Korea.  
Bipartisan criticism of the TPP poses serious obstacles to U.S. government approval of the 
pact. Candidate Trump’s controversial proposals on alliances, nuclear proliferation and North 
Korea were singular, provoking widespread opposition including from senior Republicans in 
Congress and other candidates and therefore unlikely to be easily implemented even if he were 
elected.  
Uncertainty over U.S. approval of the TPP and surprise over Donald Trump’s controversial 
proposals upset, to varying degrees, U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, 
as well as Taiwan, India and other Asian partners. Commentators in Beijing welcomed 
circumstances that lowered China’s profile in the U.S. election rhetoric; they saw clear 
advantages along with some possible disadvantages in recent uncertainty over the TPP and U.S. 
relations with Asian allies. 
U.S. Policy Implications: Sidelined Republicans, 
Mixed Asian Reactions  
Flowing from the 2016 election debate on U.S. Asia policy, special concern in the United States 
focused on Mr. Trump making decisions on Asia policy without the counsel of Republican Party 
practitioners and specialists and their affiliated think tanks and organizations that have long 
fostered strong American military, economic and diplomatic engagement with the Asia-Pacific 
region. Throughout the changing course of U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War, leading 
Republican international strategists like Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Zoellick 
favored a strong American military presence in support of Asian allies and partners and 
promotion of free trade and investment in the interests of the United States. Mr. Trump’s 
controversial policies alienated many leading Republican policy experts and organizations. 
Marginalizing this “pro-Asia” Republican cohort in American decision-making is widely seen to 
risk tilting U.S. policy toward more parochial viewpoints stressing domestic issues and giving 
inadequate consideration to Asia-Pacific interests of the United States. 
Both American and Asian observers also express concern that the election debates have made 
it more difficult for the future president to define and implement coherent American policy in the 
context of recently growing tensions in U.S.-Chinese relations and varying responses by regional 
governments to China’s assertiveness. The challenges are widely seen as formidable and the path 
America will take is now seen as significantly more uncertain as a result of the election 
campaign. Consultations in Asia revealed a range of reactions. 
China, with its increasing military, economic and diplomatic power and influence, seeks to 
avoid confrontation and support constructive and cooperative relations with the United States and 
most neighbors. But China demands respect for a widening array of core interests that involve 
extraordinary territorial claims; egregious, self-serving, state-directed interventions in 
international economics; massive military buildups targeting the United States and its allies and 
partners; and coercive and intimidating diplomacy. These demands come at the expense of 
neighbors and the interests of the United States and other powers in regional stability, peaceful 
development and non-coercive norms in the prevailing regional order. They have met with 
increasing disapproval and firmness from the U.S. government, which strengthens U.S. regional 
security, economic and political ties in line with the Obama government’s rebalance to Asia 
policy that China has strongly opposed.  
Japan, the most important U.S. ally in Asia, is reacting most clearly. Led by Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe, the politically most powerful and forecast to be the longest-lasting Japanese 
government since the Cold War, already sees a fundamental threat in Chinese coercion against 
Japan by security forces, economic pressure and diplomatic threats that fall short of direct use of 
military force. Within the limits of the Japanese constitution and Japan’s politically restricted 
military spending, the Abe government is engaging in a military buildup and redeployments and a 
range of regional and international initiatives, all with an eye to balancing China. It presses for 
firmer U.S. support for Japan and stronger American actions against China’s regional advances.
Other Asia-Pacific reactions run the gamut: 
? Australia is increasingly concerned with China’s military buildup and coercive?
expansion at its neighbors’ expense. Canberra gives priority support to its alliance with?
the United States, but interests—notably large-scale Australian exports to China—and?to
some degree public and elite opinion constrain the government’s ability to directly?
confront Beijing.
? South Korea, a very important U.S. ally, also seeks to avoid choosing between its
alliance with the United States and its strong strategic and economic interests with
China. Domestic dissonance between South Korean conservative and progressive views
is especially powerful in tilting the debate towards “alliance primacy” versus “alliance
equilibrium.”
? Taiwan is China’s “corest core interest” and the most directly threatened target of
Chinese military intimidation. Thus, Taipei always seeks stronger support from the
United States but also recognizes that serious friction in U.S.-Chinese relations is more
likely than not to have serious negative consequences for Taiwan.
? India pursues constructive relations with China while preparing military power and
developing strategic relations with the United States, Japan, Australia and other Asia-
Pacific powers to balance against perceived Chinese ambitions along the disputed Sino-
Indian border, in the Indian Ocean and with Pakistan and other South Asian states.
? The Philippines government of President Benigno Aquino (2010-2016) was closest to
Japan in its negative view of China’s regional ambitions; Aquino repeatedly called for
greater support from his American ally to deal with Chinese coercion. His successor
Rodrigo Duterte has pursued a less rigid stance, more in line with the organization the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that seeks cooperative relations with
Beijing and Washington and avoids choosing between the two.
Adding to this complicated mix for future U.S. policy is the increasingly dire situation in 
North Korea, which underlines a failure of internationally backed sanctions and other pressures to 
stop the steady development of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems that pose enormous 
security concerns, especially in Northeastern Asia.1
Background of the 2016 American Election Asia 
Debates  
U.S. leadership faced enormous dangers, struggles and debates over American policies in Asia 
during the Cold War. Neither of the massive military engagements in Korea or Vietnam ended in 
American victory. The successful U.S. opening to China came against a background of American 
weakness, not strength.2
One benefit of the Cold War was U.S. foreign and defense policy had a clear focus—dealing 
with the challenges posed by a powerful and expanding Soviet Union. Also, for much of the 
period, the U.S. president, aided by senior advisors and a few congressional leaders, controlled 
foreign policy decision-making without facing a great deal of pressure for foreign policy change 
from domestic American groups. An exception to this pattern came with the failure of the war in 
Vietnam and temporary rise in congressional, media and popular assertiveness in foreign affairs 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union left the United States as Asia’s 
unchallenged dominant power, at least for a time. However, the end of the struggle with the 
USSR also unleashed various domestic American pressures that moved U.S. foreign policy in 
different directions, prompting substantial disagreement and confusion in the making of U.S. 
foreign policy. There was protracted and acrimonious debate over how to deal with China and for 
several years Americans sharply criticized Japan’s trade practices and its risk-adverse security 
policies.3
Following the terrorist attack on America in September 2001, criticism of China and Japan 
declined given the overriding need for international cooperation to deal with terrorism. U.S.-led 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq deepened American support for closer cooperation with allies and 
with China, a trend strengthened by the global economic crisis beginning in 2008.4 The financial 
crisis exposed deep American public discontent about trade and globalization that has been a 
marked feature of the current election campaign. 
In the past decade, the general foreign policy debate has focused on perceived American 
weaknesses throughout the world, including Asia. Republican leaders in Congress and supporting 
think tanks and interest groups joined media and other commentators in depicting major 
shortcomings in the Obama administration’s policies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. One 
target was the so-called Obama Doctrine laid out in the president’s speech to graduating West 
Point cadets in 2014 that expressed wariness regarding security engagements abroad. The 
president’s cautious approach seemed in line with prevailing American public opinion, even 
though the Republican-led critics in Congress and various media stressed the president’s 
approach reflected weakness.5
The Obama administration approach to Asia was defined by its “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia 
policy publicly laid out in late 2011. The United States accompanied military pullbacks from Iraq 
and Afghanistan with greater attention to a broad range of countries in Asia, from India in the 
west to Japan in the northeast and the Pacific Island states in the southeast. U.S. diplomatic 
activism increased—including through joining regional multilateral groupings; existing 
substantial military deployments were maintained and strengthened in some areas; trade and 
investment remained open and were poised to increase, notably on the basis of the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) free trade arrangement.6  
The new U.S. activism was widely welcomed by governments in the region, with the notable 
exception of China. Under the new leadership of Communist Party Chief and President Xi 
Jinping (2012-    ), China used economic enticements on the one hand and coercive and 
intimidating means short of direct military force on the other to compel neighbors to accept 
Chinese claims to disputed territories and to side with China against American foreign policy 
initiatives. American critics of the Obama rebalance claimed that the U.S. government was not 
resolute enough in defending the U.S. role as regional security guarantor and not active enough in 
promoting greater American trade, investment and diplomatic engagement in competition with 
China’s state-directed efforts. For example, the Republican-leaning Heritage Foundation summed 
up the critics’ concerns by offering far-reaching political-security recommendations for Asia that 
added to the Foundation’s longstanding support for greater free trade and investment there. The 
recommendations included more robust military spending to allow for a long-term goal of 350 
naval ships (there are now about 280 ships in the Navy); increased support for allies and partners; 
expanded involvement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other 
regional groups; and greater firmness in dealing with Chinese challenges to regional and 
American interests.7
Overview of the 2016 U.S. Election Debates about 
Asia  
Most candidates talked about eroding or challenged U.S. international power and influence, and 
the need to re-affirm America’s role in the world. Candidates Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, John 
Kasich, Marco Rubio and Donald Trump in varying ways favored strengthening U.S. power and
leadership. Bernie Sanders favored less muscular approaches than the other candidates, 
emphasizing negotiations over military means and pressure. Most affirmed strengthened relations 
with allies without much emphasis on greater burden or cost-sharing on the part of the allies.  
On specific issues involving U.S. leadership that are discussed in more detail below, John 
Kasich joined free trade advocates in Congress such as House Speaker Paul Ryan to support the 
TPP. Clinton, Cruz, Sanders, and Trump voiced varying degrees and specifics of opposition to 
the trade pact. Donald Trump was alone in insisting that allies do more to reciprocate American 
costs in maintaining their security and overall regional stability or face American withdrawal. 
And he accepted the possibility that allies without U.S. support like Japan and South Korea might 
be compelled to develop nuclear weapons to protect themselves. All the candidates emphasized 
applying pressure to get the North Korean leader to denuclearize, but Mr. Trump was alone in 
also calling for direct talks with the North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.
China remained the main country of concern regarding challenging U.S. leadership in Asia. 
Relevant election discourse focused on how China was an unfair partner, and how the United 
States needed to counter negative features of China’s rise. China generally was not seen as an 
adversary; rather, it was depicted as neither an enemy nor a friend. Candidates Clinton, Cruz and 
Rubio argued for greater firmness against China; Sanders urged negotiations as did Trump, who 
also favored military buildup and trade sanctions if needed.  
? Hillary Clinton’s priorities included holding China accountable.8 She spoke highly of
Obama’s policies, played up her part in the rebalance, and called (with the notable
exception of the TPP) for continuity of the rebalance policies.9
? Ted Cruz said that Presidents Obama and Clinton had weakened America and
jeopardized its global interests.10
? Bernie Sanders believed in resolving international conflicts in a peaceful manner.?
Sanders said, “…we must move away from policies that favor unilateral military?
action… and that make the United States the de facto policeman of the world.”  Sanders,?
like Trump, blamed current economic problems in the United States on “disastrous trade?
policies” involving China and other countries.11
? Donald Trump said, “… we have to rebuild our military and our economy.” He held that?
international trade agreements were not beneficial; he preferred bilateral trade deals and?
opposed the TPP.12 Trump also fixed on currency manipulation, citing China and Japan.
He usually did not find fault in China and others for taking advantage of perceived 
maladroit U.S. trade policies. He promised swift and dramatic retaliation against 
Chinese and other unfair economic practices.13
Broad American concern with China remained active but secondary in the campaign debates. It 
was overshadowed by strong debate on international trade and the proposed Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) accord, and on candidate Donald Trump’s controversial proposals on allied 
burden-sharing, nuclear weapons proliferation and North Korea. 
Mr. Trump’s strong opposition to the TPP and other U.S. trade efforts was at odds with the 
free trade policies favored by Republican congressional leaders, but the Trump position had a 
strong appeal among both Republican and Democratic voters. He and Sanders reinforced each 
other’s arguments; Clinton, Cruz and others reversed or modified their positions to accord with 
the changed politics surrounding the TPP.  
Candidate Trump’s unique emphasis on getting Japan, South Korea and other allies to 
compensate America for its role as regional security guarantor prompted serious negative 
reactions that promised significant complications for U.S. alliance relations if Trump were 
elected president and attempted to follow through on his demands. His calls for Japan and South 
Korea to compensate the United States for American security support were at odds with proposals 
by Speaker Ryan, Senator John McCain (AZ) and other Republican congressional leaders as well 
as many Republican-leaning think tanks and media. Some of these Republicans publicly opposed 
such policies. 
Trump’s acceptance of Japan or South Korea developing nuclear weapons for self-defense 
following a U.S. pullback was a major departure from longstanding policies of Republican and 
Democratic U.S. governments, and was widely seen to add to the danger of war in northeastern 
Asia. 
Trump’s abrupt announcement that he would seek direct talks with North Korea’s leader 
undermined existing U.S., South Korean and Japanese policy and deviated sharply from the tough 
U.S. posture on this issue favored by the Obama government and by Republican congressional 
leaders and Republican?leaning think tanks and media. 
At bottom, these three sets of controversial proposals by Mr. Trump garnered little support in 
the United States and prompted opposition, including from prominent congressional Republicans. 
There was consensus among American and Asian observers consulted for this project that the 
election discussion politicized American foreign policy and weakened the American leadership 
position in Asia. The style of the campaign featured repeated personal attacks, gross language, 
and salacious accusations which degraded America’s image and provided fodder for Chinese and 
other opinions stressing the weaknesses of U.S. democracy.  
On policy issues, the success of the Sanders and Trump campaign attacks on the T?P
surprised American and Asian commentators, notably by underlining seemingly weak popular
American support for this important component of U.S. policy in the region. The fact that the 
Republican Party—widely seen in the region as strongly committed to U.S. defense ties with
Asia—selected Mr. Trump despite his controversial views on military disengagement from Asia
and Europe, and ????acceptance of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, raised serious doubts 
about America’s future regional role. Among Asian countries depending on military support 
from the United States, Japanese non-government commentators seemed the most concerned. On 
the other side of the spectrum of Asian views were Chinese commentators who saw opportunities
for Chinese gains in competition with the United States for leadership in Asia as a result of the 
election’s negative impact on the credibility of American commitments to Asian allies and 
friends.  
For the most part, the Asian observers balanced the above developments with evidence that 
strong engagement with Asia in the U.S. rebalance policy would likely continue. The result was a 
muddled picture of U.S. leadership sustainability. In particular, even if Hillary Clinton, an 
avowed supporter of the rebalance policy (with the exception of the TPP) were elected president, 
the election debates over Asia meant trouble ahead for U.S. leaders. The debates notably added to 
disturbing developments at home (e.g., terrorist attacks and racially motivated killings) and 
abroad (e.g., a weakened European Union and major crises involving the Middle East and Russia) 
seen as likely to preoccupy the new American president and complicate steady American 
engagement with the region. 
Priority Election Debates over U.S. Policy in Asia
The following discussion further explains specific issues in Asia during the 2015-2016 election 
campaign in order of their priority and prominence in the campaign. It addresses salient 
implications of these issues. In dealing with the relevant remarks of each of the candidates, the 
report generally treats their comments in alphabetical order. 
As seen in the above discussion, the debates about Asia come as part of a broader debate in 
the election campaign over priorities in American foreign policy. For the most part, the debates 
about Asia are second to concerns about more pressing international concerns, notably 
international terrorism.  
Another finding of this analysis is that the previous American preoccupation with China’s 
challenges to U.S. interests in Asia has less prominence than other issues in Asia in the 2015-
2016 election campaign. It is important to add here that experienced Republican and Democratic 
Asian specialists and several commentators in Asia consulted for this report judged that the 
American concern with China remained strong and could rise to the top of U.S. Asian policy 
concerns, notably in the event of a crisis caused by one or more of the many serious security, 
economic and other differences that divide the two governments.14
The Obama administration and its supporters say opportunities for American investment and 
exports are advanced through the TPP.15 The agreement also offsets China’s unfair economic 
measures because China will want to join in order not to be economically marginalized, and 
joining will force Beijing to bring its economic practices into line with those of the United 
States.16 The economic agreement also is seen to have a significant strategic importance. 
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter told Congress that passing the TPP will do more in support of 
regional stability than another aircraft carrier for U.S. forces in the Pacific.17
U.S. agreements promoting freer trade feature periodically and intensely in election 
campaigns during the post-Cold War period. Great controversy surrounded congressional 
consideration and approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993; congressional 
consideration and approval of granting Permanent Normal Trade Status for China in 2000; and 
congressional approval and passage of the bilateral Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 2011. 
Controversy also emerged when President Obama sought congressional commitment to so-called 
“fast track” consideration of the TPP through what is known as Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA). After months of intense debate, which saw Democrats like Senator Bernie Sanders voting 
“no” along with a heretofore avowed free trader, Republican Senator Ted Cruz, TPA was 
authorized by the Congress in June 2015.18
Candidates Sanders and Trump improved their performances in the primaries by focusing on 
what turned out to be widespread voter angst over American economic vulnerabilities being 
exploited by the unfair trading and investment practices of China and other countries. They 
charged that the Obama government and several of the other candidates were mistakenly seeking 
advantage in the TPP and other free trade agreements that were said to actually handicap U.S. 
ability to retaliate against unfair foreign practices. Sanders took aim at American big business 
leaders who were said to have few concerns for American workers as they relocated plants abroad 
in seeking “a few more bucks” of profit.19 Trump seemed out of place in attacking the privileged 
business elites but he successfully won over voters with rhetoric on how he would right the 
wrongs and retaliate strongly against unfair trading countries and the American business leaders 
who collaborate with them. Observers saw Cruz’s vote on TPA and Clinton’s turn against TPP as 
emblematic of a continuing shift in the election campaign period against the free trade agenda of 
the Obama government.  
Hillary Clinton’s rhetoric regarding trade had a prevailing sense of injustice, that the U.S. has 
been “wronged” and that global trading partners haven’t been “fair.” She specifically named 
China as an unfair trading partner. She said, “We need a president who knows how to compete 
against the rest of the world and win for America and for American workers. And that means, 
first and foremost, standing up to China which is the biggest abuser of global trade.”20 Clinton 
explained her opposition to the TPP based on questions over its impact on U.S. jobs and 
effectiveness in dealing with unfair economic practices by other countries.21
Ted Cruz explained his vote against TPA in June 2015 this way: “As a general matter, I agree 
(as did Ronald Reagan) that free trade is good for America” but he went on to condemn “corrupt 
Washington backroom deal-making” involved in the trade deal.22
John Kasich was one of the few candidates who spoke in strong support of free trade and the 
TPP. He said, “…the TPP, it’s critical to us, not only for economic reasons and for jobs, because 
there are so many people who are connected to getting jobs because of trade, but it allows us to 
create not only economy alliances, but also potentially strategic alliances against the Chinese. 
They are not our enemy, but they are certainly not our friend.”23
Bernie Sanders summed up his view saying, “I believe in trade, but I do not believe in 
unfettered free trade. I believe in fair trade which works for the middle class and working families 
of this country and not just large multinational corporations.”24
According to Donald Trump, an avowed free trader,  “The TPP is a horrible deal…It's a deal 
that was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take 
advantage of everyone. It's 5,600 pages long, so complex that nobody's read it...I'd rather make 
individual deals with individual countries....we need smart people making the deals, and we don't 
have smart people making the deals.”25
The election campaign discussion of trade and the TPP has seriously challenged efforts by the 
Obama government to seek congressional approval of the pact. American presidential candidates 
and other politicians from Hillary Clinton and Republican Speaker Ryan on down have been 
forced to face the popularity of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, who made opposition to such 
trade deals central elements in their campaigns. If Donald Trump is elected, the prospects for U.S. 
approval of the TPP are seen as poor. If Hillary Clinton is elected, she may privately urge the 
Obama government and the current Congress to approve the pact, risking strongly negative 
reactions. Or once in office, she may publicly move to approve the pact with amendments, 
promising a difficult and perhaps contentious process in gaining needed international and 
congressional approvals. Other options include continued opposition to or protracted delay in 
considering what to do with the TPP. 
Recent history shows that popular American sentiment against trade deals has waxed and 
waned. Supporters of free trade and the TPP are somewhat reassured by recent public opinion 
polls showing the American people remain ambivalent about withdrawing from specific trade 
deals, while a clear majority of Americans views trade much more as an economic opportunity 
than as a threat.26 In a related development, polling in February 2016 showed that American angst 
over China’s economy as a danger to the United States declined over the previous year and was 
lower than a host of other concerns, including even climate change and infectious diseases.27 
Japan and other Asia-Pacific governments that are members of the TPP are actively making 
policy changes and taking other steps to bring their practices into line with the pact. As a result, 
they view negatively the recent uncertainty over U.S. congressional approval of the pact in light 
of the prominent anti-TPP election rhetoric. The Abe government in Tokyo is said to be 
determined to use its strengthened position in the Diet to approve the deal despite an anticipated 
U.S. stall. South Korea and Taiwan are not now members of the group, but their governments are 
actively planning and preparing for membership through internal government studies and task 
forces. South Korean disappointment with an anticipated U.S. stall in approval is offset to some 
degree by Seoul’s existing Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement with Washington, its 
reported confidence that the TPP will eventually be approved, and the view that public opinion in 
South Korea is not paying much attention to this issue. Seoul is said by some observers to 
welcome the delay so it can better prepare for entry into the pact. And, observers in South Korea 
said the United States and other TPP members should endeavor to facilitate China’s entry so as to 
reduce regional tensions over the economic pact.  
Taipei is very trade dependent—the value of its trade is more than 100% of its GDP. Because 
of Chinese pressure, it is very isolated from international economic pacts and unlikely to have the 
option to join a concurrent Asia-Pacific Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
negotiation which includes China. Hence, U.S. leadership is seen in Taipei as key in gaining 
entry to the TPP, whose members account for 35% of Taiwan’s trade. The government also uses 
the incentive of joining TPP as leverage to drive reform, efficiency and competitiveness in 
Taiwan’s economy, especially under the new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led 
government. 
Australia, a TPP signatory, continues to support the agreement overall even as trade declines 
with the United States for structural reasons and domestic sentiment has qualms about the 
agreement. The impact of a TPP failure on Australia’s bilateral trade with the United States is 
expected to be less dire given the existing Australia-U.S. free trade agreement, though Australia 
runs a trade deficit with the United States. India is not in any rush to join the TPP and is therefore 
less concerned by a TPP stall. India has more pressing commercial issues with the United States, 
including outsourcing and worker visas. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Vietnam are already 
TPP signatories and both are concerned about a TPP stall. Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines have expressed varying degrees of interest in eventual TPP membership, but as non-
signatories there is little urgency to their watchfulness. Most American allies and partners appear 
to view America’s TPP debate less through immediate economic concerns and more through 
worry about U.S. inability to sustain regional commitments beyond the military dimensions of 
policy. Many also worry that a TPP stall or failure will favor China. 
Chinese observers are concerned that a failure of the TPP would reflect protectionist and anti-
globalization sentiment throughout developed countries that will negatively impact China’s 
economic growth. At the same time, a failure of the United States to approve the TPP is seen in 
Beijing and elsewhere in Asia as playing to China’s advantage and undercutting a key element in 
U.S. engagement with Asia. As President Obama warns, the consequences would allow China a 
greater role to set the norms on regional economic relationships using such China-led 
mechanisms as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as Chinese efforts such as the One Belt One Road 
(OBOR) Initiative and China’s Silk Road Fund.28 The consequences also would reduce incentives 
by regional countries to align closely with an overall U.S. approach to the region that, without the 
TPP, would depend even more on the often controversial military dimension of American 
engagement with Asia.  
A major plank in the Obama government’s rebalance policy in Asia has been to strengthen 
relations with American treaty allies—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and 
Thailand—and with other regional powers, notably Singapore as well as India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Vietnam that are interested in closer strategic alignment with the United States. 
Such efforts expand and strengthen overall U.S. regional influence to insure that American goals 
of security, stability, prosperity and political freedom are met. An underlining theme in the 
rebalance is that allies and partners cooperating closely with the United States will undertake 
some of the responsibility borne by the United States for sustaining regional peace and 
development. Specific burden and cost-sharing obligations by host governments in support of 
U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea have long been features of American alliance 
relationships in Asia; they have not been emphasized in the rebalance policy.29
The Obama administration’s approach to allies and partners, like much of the rebalance 
policy, was generally supported in Congress, with Republican critics often arguing that even 
more needed to be done. Typically, Speaker Ryan said, “It’s not that America might go it alone. 
It’s that our allies might go their own way—because they’re losing faith in us. Saudi Arabia 
speaks openly of building nuclear weapons. South Korea and Japan harbor similar thoughts...Our 
allies…are calling for help, and nobody’s picking up the phone.”30
Relations with allies was not a significant issue for Bernie Sanders, while candidates Clinton, 
Cruz, and Kasich underscored that U.S. allies in Asia needed reassurance and greater American 
attention. They generally eschewed specific recommendations involving Japan and South Korea. 
In contrast, Donald Trump had an impact in trying to turn the tables in the campaign discourse to 
a discussion of what the allies, notably Japan and South Korea, were doing to support America 
rather than the other way around. He also lumped U.S. ally Japan together with China over what 
he saw as Japan’s long record of currency manipulation that disadvantaged U.S. exports.31
Hillary Clinton talked about her work as secretary of state to rebuild the confidence of allies. 
Clinton said, “Our best allies and friends in Europe and Asia were really put out with us because 
of the way they'd been treated by the Bush administration and were very skeptical that the United 
States was a good ally any longer and wanted to lead the world toward peace, prosperity and 
security. I spent so much of my time getting back the confidence and the trust of our friends and 
allies around the world.”32  
Ted Cruz advised that the United States should do better to keep our Asian allies under our 
influence so that they don’t move toward China. He said, “What should concern us, though, is to 
the extent that China is building alliances, regional alliances throughout the Pacific that are 
coming at the expense of other nations that had been standing with America…And to the extent 
this represents other countries in Asia moving more into the orbit of China and away from the 
West, that is a disturbing development.”33  
John Kasich averred that “…our allies feel neglected and abused. We must rebuild these 
critical relationships in order to better advance our national interests… this includes … 
supporting our Pacific allies in the face of Chinese belligerence.”34
Bernie Sander’s limited commentary on relations with allies in Asia included this remark on 
the South China Sea disputes, “In my view, we have to work with our partners …to get countries 
in the region to find diplomatic solutions to their disputes. […]We have to continue to reassure 
our allies in the region, including the Philippines, that we are committed to work with them to 
prevent instability.”35
In stark contrast to the other candidates, Donald Trump argued that the cost of the American 
military commitments to defend Japan and South Korea is a major drain on limited U.S. 
resources that weakens America’s economic and overall national power and needs to be reversed, 
either by Japan and South Korea compensating the United States or by American pull back. 
Trump played down the possible adverse consequences of such a withdrawal, at times arguing 
that South Korea and Japan are strong enough to deal with aggressive North Korea and that 
Japanese and South Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons in order to support their security 
following U.S. withdrawal need not alarm the United States.
Trump said, “We have 28,000 soldiers on the line in South Korea between the mad-man [Kim 
Jong Un] and them. We get practically nothing compared to the cost for this.” He added, “Our 
military is depleted. But we take care of?Japan, we take care of South Korea…every time this 
maniac from North Korea does anything, we immediately send our ships. We get virtually 
nothing.”36
On proposed U.S. withdrawal, he said, “Yes, I would. I would not do so happily, but I would 
be willing to [withdraw U.S. troops from Japan and South Korea]. Not happily. [...] We cannot 
afford to be losing vast amounts of billions of dollars on all of this. We just can’t do it 
anymore.”37
On Japan and South Korea seeking nuclear weapons for defense after U.S. withdrawal, the 
candidate declared that proliferation is “going to happen anyway.” And he said that, “If Japan 
had that nuclear threat, I’m not sure that would be a bad thing for us.” Nor would it be so bad, he?
??? said, if South Korea and Saudi Arabia had nuclear weapons, too.38
Donald Trump’s line of argument on allies and related issues of burden-sharing, arms expansion 
and nuclear weapons proliferation are widely seen in the United States and in Asia as having 
potentially profound implications for American interests in stability and development. That the 
United States would support a candidate with such views raises significant concerns for American 
allies like Japan and South Korea that benefit greatly from expensive U.S. military presence, as 
well as others like Australia, which has a record of sharing the military burden with well-trained 
troops prepared to engage whenever the United States confronts an adversary. China seeks U.S. 
military pullback from along its strategic eastern rim, but it would face enormous uncertainties in 
how to deal with nuclear North Korea and with governments in Tokyo and Seoul seeking 
armaments, including nuclear weapons for self-defense in a new and uncertain security 
environment in Northeast Asia.  
If elected, Mr. Trump will have difficulty implementing his proposed policies toward Asian 
allies. Overall, the view in Washington toward these initiatives has been negative. The depth of
opposition was seen notably when leading Republican senators, accompanied by some leading 
Democratic senators with strong involvement in Asian affairs, traveled to Asia in May and June 
2016 with a clear message of resolve to sustain and strengthen U.S. relations with Asian allies 
during stops in Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Speaker Ryan and the Republican 
committee chairmen underlined their resolve to continue strong support for allies in a major 
foreign policy document in June 2016.39
Against that background, commentators in Japan registered a range of views on alliance 
relations under a new U.S. president. They generally were prepared to work closely with Hillary 
Clinton who adhered, with the exception of the TPP, to the framework of the rebalance policy 
which Japan supported. They sought increased support for Japan in its firm stance against China, 
viewing positively Clinton’s promised greater American resolve on its many differences with 
China.  
Japanese government officials were wary of? but prepared to work with Donald Trump. 
Non-government Japanese commentators consulted for this report showed greater concern. 
Some acknowledged the difficulty a Trump administration would have in carrying out 
controversial proposals, notably withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan in the event Japan did not 
meet U.S. demands on cost-sharing. Congressional opposition, concern from U.S. military 
leaders responsible for Japan’s defense, adverse media treatment and other possible checks on 
such drastic foreign policy moves were duly noted. Nonetheless, the anticipated result would be
serious disruption and uncertainty in the U.S. commitment at a time when Japan faces a growing 
nuclear weapons threat from North Korea and a tense stand-off in its relations with a rising China 
and its growing power and influence. Candidate Trump’s stance also is seen as possibly 
prompting new U.S. pressure on Japan to do more regarding its own defense efforts and share 
more of the costs and burden in maintaining stability in Northeast Asia and other regions 
important to Japanese stability. 
Some non-government commentators added a sense of deep resentment for Mr. Trump’s 
accusations of Japan “free riding” on security matters. His public charges against Japan ran 
against Japanese views of generous Japanese monetary burden-sharing for U.S. forces in Japan 
and Japan’s cooperative and increasing role as a loyal ally supporting American security and 
foreign policy initiatives in Asia and throughout the world. 
South Korean commentators registered similar albeit less intense concerns over Mr. Trump’s 
cost-sharing demands and possible U.S. withdrawal. They averred that Mr. Trump’s proposal was 
based on ignorance and likely would be adjusted if he came to power. Most acknowledged such 
plans would meet strong U.S. domestic resistance. Nonetheless, the resulting controversy would 
weaken American resolve in supporting South Korea. Like several of their Japanese counterparts, 
many South Korean commentators linked the proposal with the growing American opposition to 
the TPP as indicators of American international “retrenchment” and “isolationism.” And, they 
also forecast greater U.S. pressure on South Korean allies to share more of the costs of U.S.-led 
allied operations through monetary payments or building expanded South Korean military 
capacity. Several South Korean commentators associated with opposition progressive parties 
were ambivalent about such troubles in the U.S. alliance relationship. They looked forward to an 
end of conservative party rule in the 2017 South Korean presidential elections and judged that 
difficulties in U.S. alliance relations would allow for adoption of policies of greater South Korean 
flexibility to North Korea and China. Some of these progressives also were wary of Hillary 
Clinton’s avowed efforts to strengthen the U.S. alliance, judging that one result would be more 
spending and expensive military requirements for South Korea. 
South Korea’s more moderate approach to China saw the nation’s commentators differ from 
Japanese counterparts on a possible Clinton presidency for future alliance relations regarding 
China. They viewed warily candidate Clinton’s promise of greater firmness in America’s stand 
against China on various issues ranging from trade to defense. They referred to the pressure 
South Korea received from China as South Korea agreed with the United States to deploy the 
advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system as the 
latest episode of having to choose between its American ally and its increasing important and 
powerful Chinese neighbor. They advised that managing such conflicting pressures was easier 
when U.S.-China relations were cooperative and more difficult when they were tense, as they 
have become in recent years. 
Commentators in Taiwan focused their concern on possible American pull back from Japan 
and its negative implications for American defense for Taiwan in a possible conflict with China. 
Some expressed confidence based on exchanges with U.S. officials that the American security 
posture in Asia important to Taiwan’s security would not be changed. They also referred to 
contacts with Trump campaign representatives in the United States and in Taiwan reassuring 
Taiwan of strong Republican Party support, which indeed was registered in the party platform 
released during the July convention.40 They judged that Taiwan is prepared to meet American
expectations of greater burden-sharing through purchases of advanced U.S. weapons systems and 
increases in Taiwan’s defense budget. Some even wondered if the U.S. would be willing to 
 accept offers for a greater American military role in Taiwan. And they echoed the concern voiced 
in Japan and South Korea that the election campaign rhetoric showed a tendency of greater 
American domestic preoccupation that forecast less resolve in supporting U.S. commitments in 
Asia.   
Australia remains committed to its alliance with the U.S., but worries that candidate Trump’s 
comments about alliances, even if they have little resonance across the American establishment, 
suggest a “divided” America in which international crises have not had a galvanizing effect on 
American commitment to leadership. The Philippines continues to value its alliance and overall 
commercial and people-to-people relationship with the U.S. There remain questions in the 
Philippines about U.S. commitment to defending the country’s sovereignty in the South China 
Sea despite strong signals from U.S. actions and officials. Some Indians, while recognizing the 
significant improvement in bilateral partnership with the United States, wonder whether they are 
moving in that direction at a time when the United States itself may be less committed to 
alliances and partnerships and even a leading international role. An Indonesian commentator 
noted the improvement in bilateral relations with Washington but cautioned that in Indonesia’s 
case it was “just a friend,” not an ally. Malaysia has seen significant improvement in relations 
with Washington and worries that if allies are treated badly, partners such as Kuala Lumpur 
might not be well-treated in the future. This worry is especially prevalent because under the 
Obama administration, Malaysia has seen important advances in the bilateral partnership,
including an invitation to join the TPP.  
The Obama administration has isolated and pressured the North Korean regime with an ever 
stronger array of U.S.-backed international and bilateral sanctions because Pyongyang continues 
to pursue development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems in violation of 
UN Security Council resolutions. The U.S. government with few exceptions has avoided bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations with North Korea until Pyongyang shows willingness to carry out 
denuclearization. In defiance, the Kim Jong Un regime has moved ahead vigorously with nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile tests, along with rhetoric threatening South Korea, Japan and the 
United States.41 
The North’s progress in weapons development clearly showed the failure of the United States 
and its allies and other powers, notably China, to curb the nuclear weapons threat posed by North 
Korea. Against this background, some American specialists joined some advocates in South 
Korea and government representatives in China in calling for renewed negotiations and other 
outreach to North Korea. Some of these American specialists judged that unlike in the case of 
economic sanctions prompting Iran to agree to curb nuclear weapons development, North Korea 
has become so isolated from the international economy that further U.S.-backed sanctions have 
little of the impact sought by the United States. They added that the sanctions regime makes 
North Korea ever more dependent on China, which is widely suspected to be less than vigorous 
in applying sanctions, thereby allowing trade and access to foreign goods sought by North 
Korea.42 
The calls for renewed U.S. engagement in negotiations with North Korea had little impact on 
Obama government policy, which focused on stronger sanctions and stronger pressure on China 
to implement the sanctions. The Republican-led Congress went further in passing with almost 
uniform support in both houses of Congress legislation that sought to remedy what Republicans 
saw as the “failure” of the Obama government’s policy with an array of even tougher American 
sanctions against North Korea.43
North Korea’s nuclear weapons test of January 2016 ensured that the issue would be treated 
prominently in the debates. Republican candidates tended to characterize Kim Jong Un as 
irrational, avoiding comment of any strategy North Korea might have in seeking nuclear weapons 
and other strategic goals; and they blamed the alleged incompetence of the current and past U.S. 
Democratic administrations for the failure to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. 
Their recommendations focused on tightening sanctions on North Korea and pressing China to do 
more to support the sanctions. Strong sanctions also were favored by Hillary Clinton while 
Bernie Sanders had little to say about North Korea.44 
Donald Trump followed the consensus on isolating and sanctioning North Korea until he 
broke dramatically with it in an exclusive interview with Reuters in May, saying that as president 
he would be willing to meet with the North Korean leader in order to try to stop North Korea’s 
nuclear program.45 Prior to his proposal for presidential talks with North Korea’s leader, Donald 
Trump expressed both admiration and condemnation for Kim Jong Un. Trump claimed that China 
has total control over North Korea and that the United States should leverage its power over 
China to make them control North Korea better. He said, “You gotta give him [Kim Jong Un] 
credit, how many young guys […] take over these tough generals […] he takes over and he’s the 
boss, it’s incredible. He wiped out the uncle, he wiped out this one that one, this guy doesn’t play 
games and we can’t play games with him because he really does have missiles and he really does 
have nukes.” He added, “China says they don’t have that good of control over North Korea. They 
have tremendous control. I deal with the Chinese all of the time.  […] I deal with them. They tell 
me. They have total, absolute control, practically, of North Korea.”46  
As secretary of state in the first term of the Obama administration, Hillary Clinton avoided 
blaming American policy and focused instead on using China to influence North Korea and on 
being firm with North Korea that its provocations won’t be tolerated.  She said, “North Korea’s 
goal is to blackmail the world into easing the pressure on its rogue regime. We can’t give in to or 
in any way encourage this kind of bullying. Instead, we should increase pressure and send 
Pyongyang an unmistakable message that its nuclear brinksmanship won’t succeed.” She added, 
“The Chinese government, which wields influence with the North Koreans, must be more 
assertive in deterring the North's irresponsible actions, and it should take actions to halt 
prohibited activities transpiring across its borders or its firms that participate in illicit trade or 
proliferation will have to face sanctions.”47 
Ted Cruz blamed the Obama and Clinton administrations for failing to prevent North Korea 
from obtaining nuclear weapons. He said, “Why does Kim Jong Un in North Korea, a crazy 
nutcase, and that’s a technical term, have nuclear weapons? Because of the failures of the Clinton 
administration.”48 
 John Kasich supported multilateral diplomacy to resolve issues with North Korea, increasing 
security and sanctions, and he mentioned using China to apply pressure. 49 
Bernie Sanders mentioned North Korea as a dangerous anomaly and said that the United 
States should work with China to influence North Korea. He advised, “China is one of the few 
major countries in the world that has significant support for North Korea, and I think we got to do 
everything we can to put pressure on China. I worry very much about an isolated, paranoid 
country with atomic bombs.”50 
Donald Trump’s departure from the general American consensus on how to deal with nuclear 
North Korea on the one hand undermines the credibility of the Obama government’s policy of 
sanctions and isolation. It also raises uncertainties and questions on the part of U.S. allies and 
partners that have worked together with the United States in imposing tougher sanctions on North 
Korea, as well as on the part of China and the North Korean regime. Trump’s raising presidential-
level talks with North Korea disrupts the current hard-line approaches to North Korea of the 
South Korean and Japanese governments. China has called for negotiations, though Beijing 
remains wary of direct U.S.-North Korea talks that exclude China for fear of agreements adverse 
to Chinese interests. North Korea has a record of using high-level talks with American leaders for 
its own purposes that have not benefitted the United States. On the other hand, Trump’s departure 
does not yet show much appeal in the United States. North Korean commentary supporting the 
Republican candidate is used by his opponents to discredit Trump in the U.S. election race.51 
There were only a few specific comments by those consulted in Asia for this report about 
candidate Trump’s proposal for talks with Kim Jong Un. There was skepticism that the proposal 
would be implemented successfully, especially given the strong opposition in Congress and the 
Obama government. Some in Seoul said it reflected Trump’s impatience and ignorance of Korean 
affairs. Reluctant to choose in conflicts between the United States and China, observers in South 
Korea were wary of a possible increased U.S. push on South Korea to join it in applying pressure 
on China to carry out strong sanctions against North Korea. Progressives now in the political 
opposition in South Korea were open to Trump’s call for renewed high-level talks with 
Pyongyang. Some in Tokyo observed that Japan is used to such abrupt shifts in U.S. tactics 
toward North Korea, witnessed notably in the sharp U.S. move toward bilateral talks with North 
Korea following its first nuclear test in 2006. In Beijing, observers were glad that criticism of 
China’s role in North Korea remained secondary in the U.S. election campaign. The salience of 
the North Korean issue is less prominent elsewhere in Asia and U.S. policy tends to be 
interpreted through the lens of impacts of U.S. North Korea policy changes on alliance relations 
and ties to China. 
That often sharp criticism of China remains in the 2016 election debates over Asia is consistent 
with an overall hardening of American policy toward the Chinese government and its policies. 
Specialists detected a broad sense of American disappointment at the apparent failure in 
longstanding U.S. efforts to constructively interact with China’s leaders in expectation that those 
leaders would conform more to international norms in line with American interests. Instead, they 
found an ever more powerful Chinese state under the often bold leadership of President Xi 
Jinping seeking unfair advantage at America’s expense and posing ever larger challenges to 
important U.S. interests. In particular, Xi’s China: 
? Uses coercive means generally short of direct military force to advance Chinese control 
in the East and South China Seas at the expense of neighbors and American interests in 
the regional order. 
? Uses foreign exchange reserves and excess industrial capacity to launch self-serving 
international economic development programs and institutions that seek to undermine 
U.S. leadership and/or exclude the United States. 
? Advances China’s military buildup targeted at the United States in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
? Continues cyber-theft of U.S. economic assets and intellectual property, conducts unfair 
market access and currency practices, and intensified repression and political control—
all with serious adverse consequences for U.S. interests.52 
For many years, President Obama refused to join the bipartisan chorus of critics of Chinese 
behavior in the Congress and media and among a wide range of interest groups. He remained 
focused on pragmatic cooperation and managing differences constructively with Chinese leaders. 
Nevertheless, China’s egregious behavior reached a point in 2014 where the president became 
outspoken in repeatedly criticizing Chinese actions on the important issues noted above. The 
Chinese president seemed to ignore the complaints, leaving it to lower-level officials to rebut. 
Over time, the Obama administration exerted pressure and took other steps to counter cyber-theft 
of American intellectual property and economic know how, coercive expansion in the South 
China Sea, undermining sanctions against North Korea and Iran, economic controls adverse to 
American companies and growing repression of Chinese civil society and human rights. President 
Obama has particularly singled out China in an effort to garner support for the TPP. At the same 
time, President Obama and President Xi continued to pursue greater cooperation in areas where 
interests overlapped; they appeared determined not to allow their disputes to undermine efforts to 
move the overall relationship in a positive direction.53 
Though most presidential candidates voiced harsh criticism of Chinese policies and behavior, 
the mix of strong differences and positive engagement seen in the Obama administration’s policy 
toward China was reflected in the candidates similarly mixed policy recommendations. The 
contenders’ views also were in line with American public opinion that on balance was 
disapproving of the Chinese government, but ranked China lower than in the recent past as an 
economic threat and viewed China’s military as less threatening to U.S. interests than terrorism, 
nuclear weapons development in North Korea and Iran, various conflicts in the Middle East, 
climate change, refugee flows and infectious diseases.54 
Hillary Clinton’s discourse on China showed a general theme of injustice. China was seen as 
manipulative as it maneuvers for selfish gains at the expense of U.S. international interests and 
American workers. Clinton underlined her past record and continued resolve to rectify various 
 wrongs, abuses, unfair practices, and China’s threatening of allies. Key themes in her campaign 
include: 
? Holding China accountable. “As secretary of state, Clinton reasserted America’s role as 
a Pacific power and called out China’s aggressive actions in the region.  As president, 
she’ll work with friends and allies to promote strong rules of the road and institutions in 
Asia, and encourage China to be a responsible stakeholder—including on cyberspace, 
human rights, trade, territorial disputes, and climate change—and hold it accountable if 
it does not.” 55 
? China’s rise.  “How we handle that, how we respond to it will determine our future and 
the world’s future. I want to see a peaceful rise for China…but we also have to be fully 
vigilant. China's military is growing very quickly, they're establishing military 
installations that again threaten countries we have treaties with…. They're also trying to 
hack into everything that doesn't move in America. Stealing commercial secrets…from 
defense contractors, stealing huge amounts of government information, all looking for 
an advantage.”56 
? Chinese abuses. “I’ve gone toe–to–toe with China’s top leaders on some of the toughest 
issues we face, from cyber-attacks to human rights to climate change to trade and more. 
I know how they operate and they know if I’m your president they are going to have to 
toe the line because we are going to once and for all get fair treatment or they’re not 
going to get access to our markets. When you know how somebody operates and you 
know they’re always trying to game the system and you know that they really don’t care 
about the rules of the road, you have to get tough and you have to be ready to really 
draw the line.  And I think we are at that point.” 57 
Clinton’s Democratic opponent Bernie Sanders focused primarily on trade and how China’s 
development has come at the cost of American workers. He opposed international trade treaties in 
general and with China in particular because he said it led to job losses in the United States and 
the weakening of labor unions. “I voted against [permanent normal trade relations] with China, 
that was the right vote, and if elected president I will radically transform trade policies.” Sanders 
also advocated working with China to curb fossil fuel consumption and address global climate 
change.58 
Marco Rubio’s well-developed approach to China was much tougher than what he saw as the 
“disaster” of Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state and the failed engagement policy of President 
Obama. He favored major increases in defense spending and strengthened relations with allies 
and partners in the Asia-Pacific; strong retaliation against Chinese economic misconduct and use 
of the Trans Pacific Partnership and other free trade agreements to strengthen strategic ties with 
regional partners; and use of U.S. leadership statements, visa bans, asset freezes and other means 
against Chinese officials involved with human rights abuses and internal repression in China.59 
Ted Cruz said the best way to approach China is to emphasize U.S. military and economic 
might. He cited former President Ronald Reagan’s “peace through strength” approach toward the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War as a model for contemporary U.S.-China relations. Cruz also 
declared that China had committed acts of “cyberwar” against the United States, and later he 
recommended “counter attacks” to emphasize that there “will be a price to be paid.” On human 
rights, Cruz joined other senators in petitioning for a plaza outside the Chinese embassy in 
Washington to be named after Liu Xiaobo, a human rights activist and 2010 Nobel Laureate who 
is imprisoned in China.60 
According to Donald Trump, the main problem the Untied States has with China is that we’ve 
lost China’s respect and we aren’t using our power to influence them. The source of our power 
over China, according to Trump, is our economic strength and he proposed tariffs of 45 % on 
Chinese imports to counter unfair Chinese economic practices. Overall, Trump was not hostile to 
or confrontational with China. “We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with Russia and 
China. We have serious differences with these two nations, and must regard them with open eyes, 
but we are not bound to be adversaries. We should seek common ground based on shared 
interests.” Trump saw the blame for the massive U.S. trade deficit and negative impact on 
American manufacturing and job losses resting with maladroit American policies. Trump favored 
a strong military with “maximum firepower,” but tended to avoid discussing China as a national 
security threat.61 He averred that issues with China can be dealt with through negotiations using 
American strengths as leverage.62 
John Kasich was moderate about China. Kasich listed four major issues with China: North 
Korea, the South China Sea, cyber-attacks, and currency manipulation.  He advised that “We 
don’t seek confrontation with China. But then why would we? Just as we have worked with 
China since President Nixon’s historic initiative of 45 years ago, together we should forge 
innovative solutions and institutions that respect and accommodate the national security interests 
of every Pacific nation.”63 
U.S. policies dealing with China are seen as not working in several important areas. However, 
China is not seen as an enemy by the candidates or American public opinion. Most of the 
candidates, including nominees Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, favored tougher policies, 
with Trump focused on seeking leverage in negotiations centered on economic issues, while 
Clinton’s broader scope of concern included salient national security and human rights problems. 
The overall upshot of all the discussion of China in the campaign was moderate controversy over 
proposed remedies, with the possible exception of sometimes strident warnings against Donald 
Trump’s threat to impose 45% tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States.  
Observers in Beijing saw negatives with both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Like many 
Americans, they were frustrated with the downward trend in U.S.-China relations and judged that 
trend would worsen at least to some degree if Clinton were elected. Some in Beijing nonetheless 
voiced confidence that mutual interests and highly integrated U.S.-China government 
relationships would guard against relations going seriously off track. Chinese derision of Donald 
Trump earlier this year shifted to seeking advantage given the candidate’s disruption of U.S. 
alliances along China’s rim and emphasis on seeking common ground with China through 
negotiations. Overall, a common view was that China could “shape” President Trump to behave 
in line with its interests as Mr. Trump was seen as less ideological and more pragmatic than Ms. 
Clinton.  
 Commentators in Japan urged tougher U.S. policy toward China and South Koreans stressed 
avoiding increased U.S.-China tensions. In Taiwan, the new government under President Tsai 
Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sought to avoid confrontation with China 
over China’s demand that the government accept the so-called “1992 Consensus” used by Beijing 
and the previous Taiwan government of President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang Party to 
vaguely acknowledge that Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China are part of one China—a 
demand the Tsai government sees as undermining its sovereignty. Taiwanese supporters of the 
DPP judged that some increase in U.S.-China tensions on other issues might lead to more U.S. 
support for the Tsai government.  Taiwan supporters of the now opposition Kuomintang Party 
judged that U.S.-China tensions would “squeeze” Taiwan between China and the U.S., providing 
no good options. Some observers in Taiwan cautioned that Donald Trump’s proposed 
negotiations with China could lead Beijing, as in the past, to demand U.S. concessions on Taiwan 
as “a price to be paid” for better U.S. relations with China. 
Elsewhere in Asia the ongoing calibration between China and the United States continues. 
Public opinion in Australia is roughly evenly split in favorability ratings toward the U.S. and 
China, even though support for the U.S. alliance is high. Australia’s commitment to the U.S. 
alliance remains constrained by economic ties with China. India remains very wary of China but 
bilateral trade ties have boomed—including a huge trade deficit—and Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi has sought increased Chinese investment in India. But China’s cooperation with Pakistan, 
increased role among Indian Ocean states and the unresolved border dispute burden bilateral ties. 
Indians regard a tough U.S. posture on China to be ultimately useful as a basis for improving 
relations with the United States while maintaining strategic autonomy through select cooperation 
with China. Indonesia and Malaysia also do not want to choose between the United States and 
China and want Beijing-Washington bilateral relations to be neither too cooperative nor too 
conflictual. The Philippines has recently moved from tougher to more uncertain postures vis-à-vis 
China in the context of steadily upgraded cooperation with the United States through the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).  
Heading the list of disagreements in the troubled Sino-American relationship entering the U.S. 
election year of 2016 was the disagreement over Chinese expansion using coercive means short 
of direct military force to advance its control at the expense of other claimants to wide swaths of 
disputed territory in the South China Sea. 
President Obama’s responses to this and other Chinese challenges have been measured. 
President Obama became more publicly vocal against Chinese expansionism in the South China 
Sea in 2014 and 2015 and over time he followed his vocal complaints with actions. In this period, 
China’s continued massive dredging and construction of military and other installations on newly 
created South China Sea islands. In tandem came much more active U.S. military deployments in 
the disputed South China Sea, along with blunt warnings by U.S. military leaders of China’s 
ambitions. Meanwhile, more prominent U.S. cooperation with allies Japan, the Philippines and 
Australia along with India and concerned Southeast Asian powers strengthened regional states 
and complicated Chinese expansion. 
Rising tensions over the South China Sea saw U.S. armed combat aircraft repeatedly patrol 
with Philippine forces over Scarborough Shoal beginning in April. This large Chinese-claimed 
maritime feature near the main islands of the Philippines was long used by Philippine fishermen 
and patrolled by Philippine security forces until stronger Chinese coast guard forces expelled the 
fishermen, took control and occupied it in 2012. Other episodes of tension over the past year 
included Chinese armed fighter jets harassing U.S. surveillance planes by flying dangerously 
close to those planes, and U.S. naval forces disregarding Chinese military warnings and 
shadowing Chinese warships and aircraft in carrying out so-called freedom of navigation 
exercises near land features occupied by China in the disputed South China Sea. A highpoint of 
China-U.S. disagreement came when the Arbitral Tribunal affiliated with the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) ruled in July against China’s vague claims to much of the South China Sea in a 
case brought by the Philippines and strongly backed by the United States, Japan and Australia. 
Beijing had prepared for a possible adverse ruling with a large-scale propaganda campaign to 
discredit the Tribunal and the Philippines case and repeatedly warned against U.S. and other 
“outside” infringements on China’s claimed territorial sovereignty.   
Some American specialists and media commentary questioned the wisdom of the tough 
American stance. However, the Republican-led Congress held hearings, passed legislation and 
worked with the administration to fund a maritime security capacity-building initiative for 
regional countries, and issued letters and statements arguing for more forthright American 
opposition to China’s expansionist behavior that came at the expense of U.S. treaty ally the 
Philippines, as well as Vietnam, a partner of rising importance for the United States.64 
The candidates have not added much to the ongoing discussion on the South China Sea 
dispute. The debate over what the United States should do remains active, but the presidential 
candidates at best have had a secondary influence on the discussion. Thus, for example, the 
Clinton and Trump campaigns responded to the Arbitral Tribunal ruling in July with brief 
statements of support.65 
Earlier, Hillary Clinton supported the Philippines saying, “We've got challenges in the South 
China Sea because of what China is doing in building up these military installations. […]” She 
added, “I have been very strongly in support with the Philippines in this dispute and I am proud 
of the Philippines for taking their dispute to the international court … I thought that was a very 
wise decision, because there should not be a seizure of any territory until there's some kind of 
resolution that is legal.”66 
John Kasich recommended the United States increase its presence in the South China Sea and 
other nearby waters to signal to China that its actions won’t be tolerated.67  
Bernie Sanders mentioned the need to keep peace in the South China Sea in this way: “With 
China, the United States has to continue to work with our allies and partners in the region to 
maintain peace and prosperity. That means ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China 
Sea—which is critical to global commerce. It also means preventing tensions having to do with 
overlapping maritime claims from spiraling out of control between China, which claims much of 
the South China Sea, and other countries with overlapping claims of their own.”68
 Donald Trump mentioned China in the South China Sea as a threat but without much 
evidence or explanation.  He said, “[China is] building a military island in the middle of the 
South China Sea—a military island. [… ]They built it in about one year, this massive military 
port. They’re building up their military to a point that is very scary. You have a problem with 
ISIS. You have a bigger problem with China.”69 
The South China Sea dispute could easily rise in importance for the presidential candidates in the 
event of such setbacks as a shooting incident or face-off of armed forces in the contested territory. 
For now, it appears that the ongoing debate will continue along recent lines without resolution or 
serious worsening, passing from this U.S. administration to the next. 
Observers in Beijing generally supported China’s truculent response to the PCA-announced 
ruling. They advised the United States to react to the ruling in a low-key way in order to avoid 
further worsening in U.S.-China relations over the South China Sea disputes.  
Interlocutors in Tokyo and Seoul had little to add to prevailing patterns of Japan supporting a 
tougher U.S. stand on differences with China and South Korea, seeing such tensions as working 
against its interests to avoid having to choose between Washington and Beijing.
Observers in Taipei said that the Taiwan government was working closely with the U.S. 
government in preparing to respond in measured terms to the PCA-announced ruling. Taiwan 
sought to keep on good terms with Washington while avoiding major retreat from its traditional 
expansive claims to the South China Sea, which mirror Beijing’s. To do the latter could cause 
problems with Beijing at this delicate time in Taiwan-China relations by signaling that Taiwan 
was moving away from its support of territorial claims associated with one China. However, the 
ruling had a negative impact on elite and public opinion in Taiwan. In particular, the ruling used a 
phrase very offensive to people in Taiwan in referring to the Taiwan government. And to the 
reported surprise of Taipei and Washington, the Arbitral Tribunal made a ruling that Taiping 
Island, the largest natural land feature in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea which is 
controlled by Taipei, does not qualify as an island under terms of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Thus, it was not eligible to the large Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) given to islands as opposed to “rocks” permanently above sea level or above sea 
level at low tide. This development came as a significant setback to Taiwan’s claims of fishing 
and other territorial rights in the South China Sea and prompted strong negative reaction in 
Taiwan that had to be accommodated by the government, according to observers in Taipei. The 
result was a strong statement from the Taiwan government criticizing the U.S.-backed ruling and 
affirming Taiwan’s territorial claims. 
Australia has called for the PCA ruling to be followed, but in general as a non-claimant has 
supported the U.S. position and avoided becoming directly involved. It has resisted conducting 
freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPS) with the United States. Indonesia’s position vis-à-
vis China has hardened given China’s apparent claims to sea resources near Natuna, but so far 
Indonesia officially maintains that it does not have a territorial dispute with China. Malaysia, too, 
has evinced greater concerns about China’s actions, but has not publicly hailed the PCA ruling. 
The new government in the Philippines has indicated that it sees the PCA ruling as the basis of 
discussions with China and it is not clear if China will accept such an approach for bilateral 
discussions.  
As discussed above, the Xi Jinping government’s territorial expansion, cyber-theft, unfair 
economic practices and internal repression drew strong rebukes from President Obama and 
hardened the administration’s overall policy toward China. The president’s wide-ranging and 
often sharp criticism notably did not include China’s policy toward Taiwan. Rather, the president 
and his administration continued to adhere to an approach inherited from the George W. Bush 
administration that Taiwan issues should be handled in ways that avoid serious negative 
consequences for American policy toward China. For example, the president’s rebalance policy 
in the Asia-Pacific region was repeatedly and sometimes harshly criticized by China. The Obama 
government nonetheless went ahead with a wide range of initiatives with Japan, the Philippines, 
Vietnam and other countries around Taiwan, but initial administration statements about the policy 
failed to even mention Taiwan. The administration later began stating routinely that Taiwan was 
included in the rebalance policy, though it generally avoided discussing any details of what the 
United States and Taiwan were doing in the context of the rebalance, presumably to avoid 
offending China in ways seen adverse to administration interests. 
Thus, the hardening of the Obama government’s stance on various aspects of China policy has 
not been accompanied by hardening in its policy toward China over Taiwan. U.S. officials 
highlighted progress in relations with Taiwan involving cooperation on global issues, increased 
official interchanges at levels somewhat higher than in the recent past, assisting Taiwan 
membership in international bodies and other matters that were deemed less likely to prompt 
frictions with China. They avoided taking sides against presidential candidate and now President 
Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which refuses to endorse a view of 
“one China” demanded by Beijing.70 This behavior contrasted with the Obama administration use 
of a prominent news leak to voice concerns with her cross-strait policy during Tsai’s unsuccessful 
run for the presidency in 2012. The delicate cross-strait situation following the January 2016 
election caused the U.S. government to double down on efforts to encourage both Beijing and 
Taipei to avoid provocations, seek constructive communications, and reach compromise formulas 
or understandings that will avoid a break in cross-strait interchange detrimental to peace and 
stability.71
American critics of the administration’s policy toward Taiwan included Republican leaders in 
Congress, Republican-leaning think tanks, media and interest groups, along with many 
Democrats and progressive think tanks, media and interest groups advocating change in existing 
U.S. Taiwan policy to be less deferential to China. 72 They were encouraged by the end of the 
government of the long-ruling Kuomintang Party of President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) and its 
strong accommodation of Beijing.73 
There has been limited attention to Taiwan during the 2016 election debates. A few 
Republican candidates, and more prominently the Republican Party platform, and extensive 
 media commentary by a Trump campaign adviser have called for major changes in policy toward 
Taiwan to make it less deferential to Beijing.74 Regarding specific statements by the presidential 
candidates, Senator Marco Rubio has been active in congressional measures to support Taiwan in 
opposition to Beijing. He notably backed a strong U.S. military buildup to insure Taiwan’s 
protection in the face of China’s military power. He advised that U.S. policy should be guided by 
historic American reassurances of support for Taiwan and not by a reputed need to avoid 
exacerbating tensions with China over the issue.75  
Senator Cruz released a statement on the results of Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential 
elections lauding Taiwan on ideological grounds as a beacon for Democracy inspiring those in 
China and Hong Kong seeking freedom against the oppressive Communist government.76 
Senator McCain and other senators visited Asia in May-June 2016 to reassure U.S. allies and 
partners of continued strong American regional engagement despite Donald Trump’s call for 
allies depending on U.S. military protection to do more to offset the U.S. costs or face American 
withdrawal. McCain and six of the visiting senators stopped in Taiwan to affirm support for 
recently installed President Tsai Ing-wen. The visit marked the first by the chair of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee in 26 years and the largest group of U.S. senators to visit Taiwan in 
10 years.77 
The U.S. election debates on Taiwan show little deviation from the arguments seen in the 
Congress and the media prior to and during the American campaign. How Hillary Clinton’s 
promised hardening of policy on disputes with China would impact her approach to Taiwan 
remains undefined. Donald Trump also has not devoted special attention to the issue.  
Observers in Taipei are concerned that Taiwan will suffer if Donald Trump follows through 
with pledges to negotiate major agreements with China as the Taiwan issue will likely be raised 
by the Chinese side in those negotiations. Taipei also worries that candidate Trump’s approach to 
U.S. ally Japan will seriously weaken the U.S. ability to support Taiwan in the face of China’s 
military intimidation. Observers in Taiwan appreciated the resolve shown by McCain and his 
Senate colleagues to continue support for U.S. allies and partners in Asia regardless of the results 
of the American presidential election. They were encouraged by interactions with Trump 
campaign Asia expert Peter Navarro during a recent visit to Taiwan and strong support for 
Taiwan registered in the Republican Party platform.78 The PCA decision led observers to Taiwan 
to complain that its interests in the South China Sea have less priority than other concerns in 
current U.S. policy. There was broad concern among Taiwan observers on how they could 
advance Taiwan’s importance in the U.S. administration’s policy deliberations. The Taiwan 
government is preparing actively for future entry into the TPP and hopes the agreement will be 
approved by Congress, allowing Taiwan to be supported for entry by the United States in the next 
round of membership for the body.  
Taiwan issues did not figure prominently in comments by interlocutors in China or elsewhere 
in Asia. High-level interlocutors in Beijing judged that Hillary Clinton’s tougher approach would 
not involve major moves on Taiwan.  
The Obama government’s rebalance policy followed through with much greater American 
diplomatic activism throughout the region, with the president leading a variety of U.S. efforts in 
promoting values involving rule of law, human rights and democracy. In practice, such concern 
over American values often got in the way of supporting or advancing smoother U.S. relations 
with several Asian countries in recent years. Relations with defense treaty ally Thailand declined 
because U.S. legislation disapproves and restricts American relations with any government like 
the current Thai government that came to power by means of a military coup. Strong Obama 
government interest to move forward in developing closer relations with Myanmar was slowed 
by that government’s still incomplete transition from strict military rule and by such human rights 
issues as the poor treatment of the Muslim minority Rohingya people. The Communist Party-led 
governments of China and Vietnam suppress dissent, control media, restrict non-government 
organizations and allow police excesses and compromised judicial judgments in the interest of 
sustaining one-party rule. These practices led to American complaints and actions that both 
powers, important to America’s overall relationship with Asia, viewed very negatively as 
interference in their internal affairs. Concern over the abysmal record on human rights of the 
North Korean regime added to the justifications of American policy makers to sanction the 
Pyongyang regime.79 
Hillary Clinton has emphasized women’s rights, especially in China. She said Xi Jinping was 
“shameless” in hosting a meeting on women's rights at the UN while persecuting feminists in 
China.80 She sided with the persecuted Chinese feminists adding, “Well, you know, I went to 
Beijing in 1995 and said women's rights are human rights and human rights are women's rights. 
And I believe that with all my heart. [...] Human rights always have to be at the center of who we 
are as a nation, and what I will do as president. You can count on that.”81 
Clinton was one of the few candidates to mention Myanmar, noting that she had a hand in its 
liberalization. Clinton noted that a single successful election is not the end of the process. She 
said that after the November 2015 election in Myanmar, “[W]e cannot forget that one election 
does not constitute true democracy—that takes a commitment to human rights, strong institutions, 
and a thriving civil society.” 82 
A highlight of Ted Cruz’s concerns with human rights and democracy were released 
statements expressing concern about Obama’s threat to veto Cruz’s bill to rename the plaza in 
front of the Chinese embassy “Liu Xiaobo Plaza” in recognition of a prominent jailed Chinese 
dissident.83 John Kasich paid attention to human rights in general terms.84  
Bernie Sanders’ strong concern for social justice issue was not complemented with many 
statements about human rights and democracy. His campaign supported freedom in Tibet and 
political and religious rights in China.85 
Donald Trump ignored or rebuffed criticism by various international human rights bodies for 
his comments on Muslims, torture, and proposed treatment of undocumented migrants. He also 
was on record as supporting political rights in China. He said, “Why am I concerned with 
political rights? I’m a good businessman and I can be amazingly unsentimental when I need to be. 
I also recognize that when it comes down to it, we can’t do much to change a nation’s internal 
 policies. But I’m unwilling to shrug off the mistreatment of China’s citizens by their own 
government. My reason is simple: These oppressive policies make it clear that China’s current 
government has contempt for our way of life.”86  
The election debates over human rights and democracy have reflected the secondary position of 
these issues in overall U.S. policy toward Asia. Observers in Taipei and Tokyo saw their 
governments’ support for common values with the United States as grounds for continued strong 
American support for them. Observers in China registered concern that Hillary Clinton’s stand on 
values may be more “ideological” and troublesome for China. Donald Trump promises less 
attention to these issues in their view. In Southeast Asia, where democracy and human rights 
protections are mixed, there is an ongoing worry about how much the U.S. will focus and act on 
these issues. Most Southeast Asian governments face a variety of congressional and 
administration restrictions due to human rights and democracy considerations. A Filipino 
commentator expressed the view that the policies of the new administration in Manila are likely 
to increase U.S. attention to human rights conditions there. 
  
Notes 
1 This report uses campaign statements and other materials made available in the East-West Center 
Washington 2016 Presidential Candidates on Asia, http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/asia/2016-
presidential-candidates-on-asia; other news and commentary; and interviews and discussions with senior 
Republican and Democratic Asian specialists conducted in Washington, DC during June 2016 and with 
Asian specialists, commentators and officials in Beijing, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo and Washington during July 
2016. The principal findings and implications of the report were discussed with and validated by those 
interviewed, many of whom requested anonymity. The report benefitted greatly from the expert research 
assistance of Melissa Newcomb and Sarah Wang.
2 Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (New York: Hachette Book Group, 
2016); Robert Sutter, The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First Century Relations
(Lanham, MD: Rowman?&?Little?ield, 2015) p.19-68. 
3 Sutter, The United States and Asia, 43-54. 
4 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2011) p. 223-268. 
5 See among others, Leon Hadar, “Obama’s West Point Realism,” The American Conservative, May 30, 
2014, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/obamas-west-point-realism/. 
6 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald 
O’Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” toward 
Asia, Report 42448 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 28, 
2012); Robert Sutter, Michael Brown, and Timothy Adamson, Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia 
Pacific Stability (Washington, DC, George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 
2013); Timothy Adamson, Michael Brown, and Robert Sutter, Rebooting the U.S. Rebalance to Asia 
(Washington, DC, George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 2014); Hugo 
Meijer, ed., Origins and Evolution of the U.S. Rebalance toward Asia: Diplomatic, Military and Economic 
Dimensions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American 
Statecraft in Asia (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2016). 
7 Walter Lohman, Top Five Political-Security Priorities for the Asia-Pacific in 2016 (Washington, DC: 
Heritage Foundation, February 5, 2016).
8 “Issues: National Security: With policies that keep us strong and safe, America can lead the world in the 
21st century,” Hillary for America, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/national-security (accessed June 
10, 2016).  
9 “Hillary Clinton Addresses the Iran nuclear deal,” (presentation, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 
D.C., September 9, 2015) http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/09/09-clinton-iran-nuclear-deal (accessed 
July 5 2016). 
10 “Defend Our Nation,” Cruz for President, https://www.tedcruz.org/issues/defend-our-nation (accessed 
June 20, 2016).  
11 “Issues: War and Peace,” Bernie 2016, https://berniesanders.com/issues/war-and-peace/ (accessed June 
10. 2016); “Bernie Sanders: On Trade,” Council on Foreign Relations, Campaign 2016: The Candidates & 
The World, http://www.cfr.org/campaign2016/bernie-sanders/on-trade (accessed June 10. 2016). 
12 “Who said what and what it meant: The 4th GOP Debate, annotated,” The Washington Post, November 10, 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/10/well-be-annotating-the-gop-debate-
here/. 
13 “‘America First’ Foreign Policy Speech,” Washington, April 27, 2016, http://time.com/4309786/read-
donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech (accessed July 5, 2016).
14 Authors’ interviews and consultations, Washington DC, June-July, 2016; Beijing, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, 
July 2016. As cited in source note 1, this report uses campaign statements and related materials, other news 
and commentary, and interviews and consultations with senior Republican and Democratic Asia specialists 
conducted in Washington, DC during mid-2016 and with Asian specialists, commentators and officials in 
Beijing, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo and Washington during July 2016. The principal findings and implications of 
the report were discussed with and validated by those interviewed, many of whom requested anonymity. 
15 United States Congress House Foreign Affairs Committee. Hearing on Obama Administration Policy in 
the Asia-Pacific, April 28, 2016. 114th Congress. 2nd session Washington, DC (testimony of Deputy 
Secretary of State Anthony Blinken), http://www.state.gov/s/d/2016d/256694.htm (accessed July 5, 2016). 
16 “Statement of the President on the Trans Pacific Partnership,” The White House, October 5, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership
(accessed July 5, 2016). 
17 Prashanth Parameswaran, “TPP as Important as Another Aircraft Carrier,” The Diplomat, April 8, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/tpp-as-important-as-another-aircraft-carrier-us-defense-secretary/. 
18 For background see:  Congressional Research Service, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations 
and Issues for Congress, Report R42694,” March 20, 2015 and CRS reports on the earlier agreements;  Janet 
Hook, “Ted Cruz Flips on Trade Bill,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2015, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/23/ted-cruz-flips-on-trade-bill-on-eve-of-key-senate-vote/. 
19 “Bernie Sanders: On Trade,” Council on Foreign Relations, Campaign 2016: The Candidates & The 
World, http://www.cfr.org/campaign2016/bernie-sanders/on-trade (accessed June 10, 2016). 
20 “Remarks to AFL-CIO Convention,” (April 6, 2016) http://www.msnbc.com/live-online/watch/live-
clinton-speaks-at-afl-cio-convention-660024387736 (accessed July 5, 2016).   
21 “Hillary Clinton interview by PBS News Hour” (October 7, 2015) http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/oct/07/hillary-clinton-opposes-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp (accessed July 5, 2016).
22 Janet Hook, “Ted Cruz Flips on Trade Bill,” The Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2015, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/23/ted-cruz-flips-on-trade-bill-on-eve-of-key-senate-vote/. 
23 “Republican Presidential Town Hall in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,” (March 30, 2016) CNN,
http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2016/03/30/full-rush-transcript-gov-john-kasich-cnn-milwaukee-
republican-presidential-town-hall/ (accessed July 5, 2016). 
24 “Democratic Presidential Debate in Durham, New Hampshire,” (February 4, 2016) MSNBC,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/us/politics/transcript-of-the-democratic-presidential-debate.html?_r=0
(accessed July 5, 2016).   
25 “Republican Presidential Debate in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,” (November 10, 2015)  Fox News,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/10/well-be-annotating-the-gop-debate-here/
(accessed July 5, 2016). 
26 Bruce Stokes, “Republicans, especially Trump supporters, see free trade deals as bad for U.S.,” Pew 
Research Center, March 31, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/31/republicans-
especially-trump-supporters-see-free-trade-deals-as-bad-for-u-s/. 
27 Lydia Saad, “Americans See China as Top Economy Now, but U.S. in Future,” Gallup, February 22, 
2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/189347/americans-china-top-economy-future.aspx. 
28 Barack Obama, “President Obama: The TPP would let America, not China, lead the way on global trade,” 
The Washington Post, May 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-
would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-
50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.632a287bb429. 
29 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Ian E. Rinehart, Rebecca M. Nelson, Brock R. Williams,     
“Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, Sept, 29, 2015, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf; Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth D. 
Nikitin, Ian E. Rinehart, Brock R. Williams, “U.S.-South Korea Relations,” Congressional Research 
Service, April 26, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf . 
30 “A Strategy for Renewal,” (June 11, 2014) The Center for a New American Security, Washington, 
http://paulryan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=384106 (accessed July 5, 2016). See 
also discussion of relations with allies in Speaker Ryan’s June 2016 foreign policy agenda in   
http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-NSTF-PolicyPaper.pdf (accessed July 5, 2016).
31 “Interview by The New York Times,” (March 25, 2016) The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html (accessed July 5, 2016); 
“Republican CNN Telemundo Debate in Houston, Texas,” (February 25, 2016) CNN, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/25/the-cnntelemundo-republican-debate-
transcript-annotated/ (accessed July 5, 2016). 
32 “CNN Iowa Democratic Presidential Town Hall,” (January 26, 2016) CNN,
http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2016/01/26/cnn-iowa-democratic-presidential-town-hall-rush-transcript/
(accessed July 5, 2016). 
33 “Interview by Hugh Hewitt,” (April 16, 2016) The Hugh Hewitt Show 
http://www.hughhewitt.com/senator-ted-cruz-on-iran-deal-etc/ (accessed July 5, 2016). 
34“A Comprehensive Outline For American Security In A Chaotic World,” Kasich for America, 
https://www.johnkasich.com/nationalsecurity/ (accessed July 5, 2016). 
35 “Interview by the Brooklyn Daily Eagle,” (April 20, 2016) The Brooklyn Daily Eagle,
http://www.brooklyneagle.com/articles/2016/4/19/exclusive-qa-hillary-clinton-and-bernie-sanders-brooklyn-
national-issues (accessed July 5, 2016). 
36 “Interview,” (January 10, 2016) Meet the Press, NBC, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2016/jan/10/donald-trump/donald-trump-mostly-wrong-we-get-practically-nothi/ (accessed 
July 5, 2016). 
37 “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” The New York Times, March 26, 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html 
38 Gene Gerzhoy and Nick Miller, “Donald Trump thinks more countries should have nuclear weapons. 
Here’s what the research says,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-
weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/.   
39 “Sullivan, Ernst, Gardner Conclude Productive CODEL to East Asia,” (June 8, 2016) Senate Office of 
Jodi Ernst, http://www.ernst.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?id=413D4924-8E3C-4BFD-B0EF-
18E62A304A47 (accessed July 5, 2016); “Tsai, McCain pledge defence alliance,” (June 5, 2016) Asia News 
Network, http://www.asianews.network/content/tsai-mccain-pledge-defence-alliance-18858 (accessed July 
5, 2016); Speaker Paul Ryan and Congressional Republicans, “A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident 
America,” (June 9, 2016) http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-NSTF-PolicyPaper.pdf 
(accessed July 5, 2016). 
40 “The 2016 Republican Party Platform,” July 18, 2016, https://www.gop.com/the-2016-republican-party-
platform/ (accessed July 25, 2016); see Appendix for side-by-side comparison with the Democratic Party 
platform, July 21, 2016, https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Democratic-Party-
Platform-7.21.16-no-lines.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). 
41 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear 
Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service, January 15, 2016, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf .
42 Oren Dornell, “Here’s why North Korea sanctions won’t work,” USA Today, February 10, 2016, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/02/10/north-korea-sanctions-wont-work-heres-why-
china/80183710;  Dave Boyer, “With ‘newfound confidence,’ North Korea foils Obama’s hopes for Iran-
style nuclear talks,” The Washington Times, October 25, 2015, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/25/north-korea-foils-obamas-hopes-for-iran-style-nucl/. 
43 Kathleen Miller, “House Passes North Korea Sanctions Bill After Nuclear Test,” Bloomberg, January 12, 
2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-01-12/house-aims-to-toughen-north-korea-
sanctions-after-nuclear-test.   
44 Denny Roy, “North Korea vexes US presidential candidates,” PacNet Pacific Forum CSIS, No. 4, January 
11, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/160111_PacNet_1604.pdf.   
45 Steve Holland and Emily Flitter, “Exclusive: Trump would talk with North Korea’s Kim,” (May 18, 2016) 
Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-exclusive-idUSKCN0Y82JO (accessed July 
25, 2016). 
46 Michael Koziol, “‘You've got to give him credit’: Donald Trump praises Kim Jong-un,” The Sydney 
Morning Herald, January 11, 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-election/youve-got-to-give-him-
credit-donald-trump-praises-kim-jongun-20160111-gm37e2.html. 
47 Hillary Clinton, “The Briefing: Statement From Hillary Clinton on North Korea’s Apparent Nuclear 
Test,” Hillary for America, January 6, 2016,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/statements/2016/01/06/north-korea-apparent-nuclear-test/. 
48 “Ted Cruz: North Korea incident illustrates what will happen with Iran,” Reuters, January 6, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-usa-cruz-idUSKBN0UK22B20160106.   
49 Darrel Rowland, “John Kasich, other Republicans, blame Obama for North Korea H-bomb,” The 
Columbus Dispatch, January 6, 2016,  http://www.dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-daily-
briefing/2016/01/06012016---kasich-blames-obama-for-nuke.html;  John Kasich, “Republican CNN 
Telemundo Debate in Houston, Texas,” Televised Broadcast, CNN, February 25, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/25/the-cnntelemundo-republican-debate-
transcript-annotated/. 
50 Bernie Sanders, “Democratic Presidential Debate in Durham, New Hampshire,” Televised Broadcast, 
MSNBC, February 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/us/politics/transcript-of-the-democratic-
presidential-debate.html?_r=0.
51 Zack Beauchamp, “Hillary Clinton just made her best case against Donald Trump,” Vox, June 2, 2016, 
http://www.vox.com/2016/6/2/11843114/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-speech-transcript-foreign-policy.
52 Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?”  The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3, (The Elliott School 
of International Affairs, 2015), 95–122. 
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Harding.pdf. 
53 Robert Sutter, “Obama's Cautious and Calibrated Approach to an Assertive China,” YaleGlobal, April 19, 
2016, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/obamas-cautious-and-calibrated-approach-assertive-china.   
54 Jeffery M. Jones, “Americans See China's Economic Power as Diminished Threat,” Gallup, February 26, 
2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/181733/americans-china-economic-power-diminished-threat.aspx; Saad, 
“Americans See China as Top Economy Now, but U.S. in Future.” 
55 Hillary Clinton, “Issues: National Security: With policies that keep us strong and safe, America can lead 
the world in the 21st century,” Hillary for America.” 
56 Hillary Clinton, “Campaign Rally in New Hampshire,” (campaign speech, New Hampshire, June 5,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33399711.
57 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks to AFL-CIO,” (AFL-CIO Convention, Philadelphia, PA,  April 6, 2016).
58 Bernie Sanders, interview by Ezra Klein, Vox, July 28, 2015,
http://www.vox.com/2015/7/28/9014491/bernie-sanders-vox-conversation. 
59 Marco Rubio, “How My Presidency Would Deal With China,” The Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-my-presidency-would-deal-with-china-1440717685.   
60 Council on Foreign Relations, “Ted Cruz: On China,” Campaign 2016: The Candidates & The World,
http://www.cfr.org/campaign2016/ted-cruz/on-china.
61 “Donald Trump on Homeland Security,” On the Issues, 2016, 
http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/Donald_Trump_Homeland_Security.htm. 
62 Maggie Haberman, “Donald Trump Says He Favors Big Tariffs on Chinese Exports,” New York Times, 
January 7, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/01/07/donald-trump-says-he-favors-big-
tariffs-on-chinese-exports/; Donald Trump, “‘America First’ Foreign Policy Speech,” Washington, April 
27, 2016, http://time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/. 
63 John Kasich, “A Conversation With John Kasich,” (Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, December
9, 2015) http://www.cfr.org/united-states/conversation-john-kasich/p37304; John Kasich, “Republican
Presidential Debate in Miami, Florida,” Televised Broadcast, CNN, March 10, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/10/politics/republican-debate-transcript-full-text/index.html. 
64 Ronald O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: 
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 31, 2016, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf .
65 Amanda Becker, “Clinton Welcomes South China Sea ruling, says critical to U.S. economy,” Reuters,
July 12, 2016, http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL1N19Y285; “Clinton, Trump call on 
parties to respect South China Sea ruling,” GMA News Online, July 13, 2016, 
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/573455/news/nation/clinton-trump-call-on-parties-to-respect-
south-china-sea-ruling. 
66 Hillary Clinton, “Interview by ABS-CBN,? ABS-CBN News North America, February 24, 2016, 
http://news.abs-cbn.com/global-filipino/02/23/16/clinton-backs-ph-moves-in-sea-dispute-with-china.
67 John Kasich, “A Comprehensive Outline For American Security In A Chaotic World,” Blog 4 Presidents, 
http://blog.4president.org/2016/2015/11/john-kasich-national-security-speech-a-comprehensive-outline-for-
american-security-in-a-chaotic-worl.html.
68 Bernie Sanders, “Interview with Brooklyn Daily Eagle,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, April 19, 2016, 
http://www.brooklyneagle.com/articles/2016/4/19/exclusive-qa-hillary-clinton-and-bernie-sanders-brooklyn-
national-issues.
69 Donald Trump, “Presidential Campaign Announcement,” (New York, New York, June 16, 2015), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/16/donald-trump-transcript-our-country-needs-a-truly-great-leader/.
70 “China cuts contact with Taiwan liaison body,” Christopher Bodeen, The Boston Globe, June 25, 2016, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/06/25/china-cuts-contact-with-taiwan-liaison-
body/8le6UVZszS62lSFk5HVrcP/story.html. 
71 Robert Sutter, “The Taiwan elections: Don't expect a US policy change,” The Interpreter, January 20, 
2016, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/01/20/The-Taiwan-elections-Dont-expect-a-US-policy-
change.aspx.   
72 The critics generally used three lines of argument in advocating for change in U.S. policy less deferential 
to Beijing over the Taiwan issue. (1.) One group strongly urges U.S. policy to deal with Taiwan for its own 
sake and thus argues for more forthright American government support for Taiwan’s entry into the TPP, 
more frequent U.S. cabinet-level visits to Taiwan, and the sale of more advanced U.S. military equipment to 
Taiwan; they also advise that Taiwan should be at the center of recently strong American leadership 
complaints about Chinese bullying and intimidation of neighbors. (2.) A second group strives to counter 
Chinese expansionism at American expense with a clear strategy working with China’s neighbors involving 
maritime control, and interdiction if necessary. Taiwan is at the center of the so-called first island chain and 
looms large in such plans. They involve gaining Taiwan’s cooperation in setting and monitoring sensors and 
other means of surveillance, preparing to deploy mobile anti-ship missile units to various locations in the 
first island chain, and readiness to use mines and other means to deny access to Chinese ships and 
submarines. (3.) A third group argues that America should take actions showing greater support for Taiwan 
as part of a cost imposition strategy to counter Xi Jinping’s anti-American practices. In their view, the kinds 
of steps advocated by the previous two groups should be considered and used as the United States endeavors 
to show Beijing that its various challenges to U.S. interests will not be cost-free and actually will be 
counterproductive for Chinese concerns on the all-important Taiwan issue. 
73 For differing approaches on how to handle the Taiwan issue, see among others: Richard C. Bush III, 
“Cross-Strait relations: Not a one-way street,” Brookings Institution, April 22, 2016, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/04/22/cross-strait-relations-not-a-one-way-street/; 
Mark Stokes and Sabrina Tsai, “The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait,” Project 
2049,http://www.project2049.net/documents/Future_US%20Policy%20Options%20in%20the%20Taiwan%
20Strait_Project%202049.pdf (February 1, 2016); T.X. Hammes, “Strategy for an Unthinkable Conflict,”
The Diplomat, July 27, 2012,  http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/military-strategy-for-an-unthinkable-
conflict/; John Bolton, “China-Taiwan tensions are rising,” John Bolton PAC, April 25, 2016, 
http://www.boltonpac.com/2016/04/bolton-china-taiwan-tensions-rising-obama-responds-critical/.   
74 “The 2016 Republican Party Platform,” July 18, 2016, https://www.gop.com/the-2016-republican-party-
platform/ (accessed July 25, 2016); Peter Navarro, “America Can’t Dump Taiwan,” The National Interest, 
July 19, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-cant-dump-taiwan-17040 (accessed July 29, 2016). 
75 William Lowther, “US presidential candidate pledges to defend Taiwan,” The Taipei Times, January 9, 
2016, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/01/09/2003636798.
76 Ted Cruz, “Sen. Cruz: Taiwan Is Exemplar of Liberty and Best Hope for Peace in East Asia,” Senate 
Office of Ted Cruz, January 16, 2016, https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2576.
77 William Lowther, “Tsai has ‘very successful’ US meetings,” The Taipei Times, June 4, 2015,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/06/04/2003619870.
78 “The 2016 Republican Party Platform,” July 18, 2016, https://www.gop.com/the-2016-republican-party-
platform/ (accessed July 25, 2016); see Appendix for side-by-side comparison with the Democratic Party 
platform, July 21, 2016, https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Democratic-Party-
Platform-7.21.16-no-lines.pdf (accessed July 25, 2016). 
79 See review of these and other human rights issues in Asia in “Asia: Human Rights Watch,” Human Rights 
Watch, https://www.hrw.org/asia; Department of State, “2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” 
April 13, 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/04/255799.htm.
80 Hillary Clinton, Twitter (as reported by The Sydney Morning Herald), September 7, 2016, 
http://www.smh.com.au/world/chinese-president-xi-jinping-shameless-for-hosting-summit-on-womens-
rights-says-hillary-clinton-20150927-gjw67c.html#ixzz3wtfkiAVb%20. 
81 Hillary Clinton, “Democratic Presidential Debate in Las Vegas, Nevada” Televised Broadcast, MSNBC,
February 18, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/transcript-msnbc-telemundo-clinton-
sanders-town-hall-n520781.   
82 Hillary Clinton, “The Briefing: Statement from Hillary Clinton on the Burmese Election,” Hillary for 
America, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/statements/2015/11/11/statement-from-hillary-clinton-on-
the-burmese-election/.
83 Ted Cruz, “Sen. Cruz Responds to Obama Administration Threat to Veto Bill Honoring Chinese 
Dissidents,” Senate Office of Ted Cruz, February 16, 2016, 
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2596.
84 John Kasich, “A Conversation With John Kasich,” (Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 
December 9, 2015) http://www.cfr.org/united-states/conversation-john-kasich/p37304.
85 “Bernie Sanders on China,” Feel the Bern, http://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-china/. 
86 “Donald Trump on China,” On the Issues, http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Donald_Trump_China.htm.  
AMERICA’S 2016 ELECTION DEBATE ON ASIA POLICY AND ASIAN REACTIONS| 35 
Appendix: Comparison of 2016 Democratic and 
Republican Party Platforms’ Asia Policies  
Policy Topic 2016 Democratic Party Platform







“From the Asia Pacific to the Indian 
Ocean, we will deepen our relationships 
in the region with Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, 
and Thailand. We will honor our historic 
commitment to Japan. We will continue 
to invest in a long-term strategic 
partnership with India—the world's 
largest democracy, a nation of great 
diversity, and an important Pacific 
power. We will build on the historic 
opening with Burma and advocate for 
greater human rights protections and 
national reconciliation among Burma's 
many different ethnic groups.”  
(p 49) 
“We are a Pacific nation with economic, 
military, and cultural ties to all the 
countries of the oceanic rim and treaty 
alliances with Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.” 
(p 48) 
"India is our geopolitical ally and a 
strategic trading partner. The dynamism 
of its people and the endurance of their 
democratic institutions are earning their 
country a position of leadership not only 
in Asia but throughout the world. We 
encourage the Indian government to 
permit expanded foreign investment and 
trade, the key to rising living standards for 
those left out of their country’s energetic 
economy. For all of India’s religious 
communities, we urge protection against 
violence and discrimination. Republicans 
note with pride the contributions to our 
country that are made by our fellow 
citizens of Indian ancestry." (p 49)
On North 
Korea:
“North Korea is perhaps the most 
repressive regime on the planet, run by a 
sadistic dictator. It has conducted several 
nuclear tests and is attempting to develop 
the capability to put a nuclear warhead on 
a long-range missile that could directly 
threaten the United States. The regime is 
also responsible for grave human rights 
abuses against the North Korean people. 
Yet Donald Trump praises North Korea’s 
dictator; threatens to abandon our treaty 
allies, Japan and South Korea; and 
encourages the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in the region. This approach is 
incoherent and rather than solving a 
global crisis, would create a new one. 
Democrats will protect America and our 
allies, press China to restrain North Korea, 
and sharpen the choices for Pyongyang to 
compel it to abandon its illegal nuclear 
and missile programs.” (p 43) 
“Democrats will push back against 
North Korean aggression and press 
China to play by the rules.” (p 49) 
“With them, we look toward the 
establishment of human rights for the 
people of North Korea. We urge the 
government of China to recognize the 
inevitability of change in the Kim family’s 
slave state and, for everyone’s safety 
against nuclear disaster, to hasten 
positive change on the Korean peninsula.” 
(p 48) 
“The United States will continue to 
demand the complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible dismantlement of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program with 
full accounting of its proliferation 
activities. We also pledge to counter 
any threats from the North Korean 
regime.”  (p 48) 
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On China: 
"China and other countries are using 
unfair trade practices to tilt the playing 
field against American workers and 
businesses. When they dump  cheap 
products into our markets, subsidize 
state-owned enterprises, devalue 
currencies, and discriminate against 
American companies, our middle class 
pays the price. That has to stop. 
Democrats will use all our trade 
enforcement tools to hold China and other 
trading partners accountable—because 
no country should be able to manipulate 
their currencies to gain a competitive 
advantage." (p 13) 
“We will stand up to Beijing on unfair 
trade practices, currency manipulation, 
censorship of the internet, piracy, and 
cyberattacks. And we will look for areas 
of cooperation, including on combatting 
climate change and nuclear 
proliferation.” (p 49) 
"We cannot allow China to continue its 
currency manipulation, exclusion of U.S. 
products from government purchases, 
and subsidization of Chinese companies 
to thwart American imports. The current 
Administration’s way of dealing with these 
violations of world trade standards has 
been a virtual surrender." (p 2)  
"Today, the worst offenses against 
intellectual property rights come from 
abroad, especially in China. We call for 
strong action by Congress and a new 
Republican president to enforce 
intellectual property laws against all 
infringers, whether foreign or domestic." 
(p 15) 
“China’s behavior has negated the 
optimistic language of our last platform 
concerning our future relations with 
China. The liberalizing policies of recent 
decades have been abruptly reversed, 
dissent brutally crushed, religious 
persecution heightened, the internet 
crippled, a barbaric population control 
two-child policy of forced abortions and 
forced sterilizations continued, and the 
cult of Mao revived.” (p 48) 
On
Taiwan:
“We are committed to a ‘One China’ 
policy and the Taiwan Relations Act and 
will continue to support a peaceful 
resolution of Cross-Strait issues that is 
consistent with the wishes and best 
interests of the people of Taiwan.”       
(p 49) 
“We salute the people of Taiwan, with 
whom we share the values of democracy, 
human rights, a free market economy, 
and the rule of law. Our relations will 
continue to be based upon the provisions 
of the Taiwan Relations Act, and we affirm 
the Six Assurances given to Taiwan in 
1982 by President Reagan.” (p 48) 
“We oppose any unilateral steps by either 
side to alter the status quo in the Taiwan 
Straits on the principle that all issues 
regarding the island’s future must be 
resolved peacefully, through dialogue, and 
be agreeable to the people of Taiwan. If 
China were to violate those principles, the 
United States, in accord with the Taiwan 
Relations Act, will help Taiwan defend 
itself.” (p 48) 
“We praise efforts by the new 
government in Taipei to continue 
constructive relations across the 
Taiwan Strait and call on China to 
reciprocate. As a loyal friend of 
America, Taiwan has merited our strong 
support, including free trade agreement 
status, the timely sale of defensive 
arms including technology to build 
diesel submarines, and full participation 
in the World Health Organization, 
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International Civil Aviation 
Organization, and other multilateral 




“We will also work with our allies and 
partners to fortify regional institutions 
and norms as well as protect freedom of 
the seas in the South China Sea.”       
(p 49) 
“To distract the populace from its 
increasing economic problems and, more 
importantly, to expand its military might, 
the government asserts a preposterous 
claim to the entire South China Sea and 
continues to dredge ports and create 
landing fields in contested waters where 
none have existed before, ever nearer to 
U.S. territories and our allies, while 
building a navy far out of proportion to 
defensive purposes.” (p 48) 
"The complacency of the Obama regime 
has emboldened the Chinese government 
and military to issue threats of 
intimidation throughout the South China 
Sea, not to mention parading their new 
missile, ‘the Guam Killer,’ down the main 
streets of Beijing, a direct shot at Guam as 





“We will promote greater respect for 
human rights, including the rights of 
Tibetans.” (p 49) 
“Meanwhile, cultural genocide continues 
in Tibet and Xinjiang, the promised 
autonomy of Hong Kong is eroded, the 
currency is manipulated, our technology 
is stolen, and intellectual property and 
copyrights are mocked in an economy 
based on piracy. In business terms, this is 
not competition; it is a hostile takeover. 
For any American company to abet those 
offenses, especially governmental 
censorship and tracking of dissenters, is a 
disgrace.” (p 48) 
“The return to Maoism by China’s 
current rulers is not reason to 
disengage with the Chinese people or 
their institutions. We welcome 
students, tourists, and investors, who 
can see for themselves our vibrant 
American democracy and how real 
democracy works. We caution, 
however, against academic or cultural 
operations under the control of the 
Chinese government and call upon 
American colleges to dissociate 
themselves from this increasing threat 
to academic freedom and honest 
research.” (p 48) 







“We will build on the historic opening 
with Burma and advocate for greater 
human rights protections and national 
reconciliation among Burma’s many 
different ethnic groups.” (p 49) 
“Most of the nations of Southeast Asia 
have set aside crippling ideologies and 
sought material progress in free 
enterprise and democracy. We 
congratulate the people of Burma on 
their emergence from authoritarian rule 
and urge their respect for the rights of 
their country’s minority populations. 
Our improved relations with Vietnam — 
including arms sales — must advance 
efforts to obtain an accounting for, and 
repatriation of the remains of, 
Americans who gave their lives in the 
cause of Vietnamese freedom. We 
cannot overlook the continued 
repression of fundamental rights and 
religious freedom, as well as retribution 
against ethnic minorities and others 
who assisted U.S. forces during the 







"China and other countries are using 
unfair trade practices to tilt the playing 
field against American workers and 
businesses. When they dump 14 cheap 
products into our markets, subsidize 
state-owned enterprises, devalue 
currencies, and discriminate against 
American companies, our middle class 
pays the price. That has to stop. 
Democrats will use all our trade 
enforcement tools to hold China and other 
trading partners accountable—because 
no country should be able to manipulate 
their currencies to gain a competitive 
advantage." (p 13) 
“While we believe that openness to the 
world economy is an important source 
of American leadership and dynamism, 
we will oppose trade agreements that 
do not support good American jobs, 
raise wages, and improve our national 
security. We believe any new trade 
agreements must include strong and 
enforceable labor and environmental 
standards in their core text with 
streamlined and effective enforcement 
mechanisms. Trade agreements should 
crack down on the unfair and illegal 
subsidies other countries grant their 
businesses at the expense of ours. It 
should promote innovation of and 
access to lifesaving medicines. And it 
should protect a free and open internet. 
We should never enter into a trade 
agreement that prevents our 
government, or other governments, 
from putting in place rules that protect 
“International trade is crucial for all 
sectors of America’s economy. Massive 
trade deficits are not. We envision a 
worldwide multilateral agreement among 
nations committed to the principles of 
open markets, what has been called a 
‘Reagan Economic Zone,’ in which free 
trade will truly be fair trade for all 
concerned.” (p 2) 
"We cannot allow China to continue its 
currency manipulation, exclusion of U.S. 
products from government purchases, 
and subsidization of Chinese companies 
to thwart American imports. The current 
Administration’s way of dealing with these 
violations of world trade standards has 
been a virtual surrender." (p 2)  
"At the same time, we look to broaden our 
trade agreements with countries which 
share our values and commitment to 
fairness, along with transparency in our 
commercial and business practices. In 
pursuing that objective, the American 
people demand transparency, full 
disclosure, protection of our national 
sovereignty, and tough negotiation on the 
part of those who are supposed to 
advance the interests of U.S. workers. 
Significant trade agreements should not 
be rushed or undertaken in a Lame Duck 
Congress." (p 3)  
"Today, the worst offenses against 
intellectual property rights come from 
abroad, especially in China. We call for 
strong action by Congress and a new 
Republican president to enforce 
intellectual property laws against all 
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the environment, food safety, or the 
health of American citizens or others 
around the world. These are the 
standards Democrats believe must be 
applied to all trade agreements, 
including the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP).” (p 14)   
infringers, whether foreign or 





(No mention of this issue) 
“Throughout the history of our nation, the 
patriotism exhibited by our brothers and 
sisters in the territories of Guam, the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and Puerto Rico has often gone 
unacknowledged. Year after year, the 
citizens quietly, without fanfare, send 
their sons and daughters into the U.S. 
Armed Services.  […] We call for the 
appointment of a commonwealth and 
territories advisory committee consisting 
of representatives from all five U.S. 
territories. The committee will be 
integrated into the president’s transition 
team and be tasked with performing a 
holistic review of all federal regulations 
affecting the territories and 
commonwealths.” (p 30) 
"The complacency of the Obama regime 
has emboldened the Chinese 
government and military to issue 
threats of intimidation throughout the 
South China Sea, not to mention 
parading their new missile, ‘the Guam 
Killer,’ down the main streets of Beijing, 
a direct shot at Guam as America’s first 
line of defense." (p 48) 
Sources: Republican Platform 2016 (July 18, 2016) and 2016 Democratic Party Platform (July 
21, 2016). Page numbers reflect those in the source rather than the report.  
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